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Abstract: 
Between 2007 and 2011 the number of registered voters in Turkey increased by more than 
ten million, partially due to population increase but mainly due to a change in the voter 
registration system.  Together with nearly three million DP and GP supporters who deserted 
their parties, the new voters constituted about a quarter of the electorate who participated in 
the 2011 election. Through descriptive statistics at national, regional and provincial levels, 
the geographical, demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics of these voters 
are explored.  Then through systems of party vote equations, estimated separately for 
different regions of the country, how they voted is investigated. The BDP was the main 
beneficiary of the rise in the registered voters, which were disproportionately located in the 
Central-east and South-east.  This occurred at the expense of the ruling AKP.  The DP and 
GP votes, which were concentrated in the western and central parts of the country, and the 
new voters in these regions moved mainly to the AKP and CHP.  In central provinces, the 
MHP captured a slice of the new voters and former DP supporters too, but it lost a portion 
of its own supporters to the CHP in the West. 
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1.          Introduction    
 
Number of registered voters increased by 10.2 million, or 24 percent, between the 22 
July 2007 and 12 June 2011 Turkish parliamentary elections.  Almost one out of every 
five voters who cast a valid vote in 2011 was a new voter.  Beside population increase, 
the switch to a system of automatic registration of all citizens eligible to vote was 
responsible for this.  Still it raised eyebrows and made many to wonder whether an 
impropriety was involved, as the rise was a multiple times the corresponding increase 
between 3 November 2002 and 22 July 2007 parliamentary elections, which was only 
1.3 million, or 3 percent.  Why the change in the electorate was so high between the 
last two elections is one of the questions that need to be addressed to understand the 
outcome of the 2011 election and to predict future ones. Whether the participation rate 
changed after involuntary registration of so many people, whether the demographic 
and socio-economic make- up of the new voters, their geographical distribution, and 
their political leanings were similar to the rest of the electorate, are some others.   
 
The voters up for grabs in the last election were not limited only to the new voters.  In 
addition, 1.1 million people who supported the Young Party (GP) in 2007 had to make 
another choice in 2011 when their party did not enter the election and disappeared 
from the political scene.  Furthermore, about 1.6 million of the 1.9 million people who 
supported the Democrat Party (DP) in 2007 deserted the party in 2011.2  Collectively, 
these constituted more than 6 percent of the valid votes cast in 2011.  Understanding 
where they ended up is quite important also.    
 
Although a number of recent studies analyzed the outcome of the 2011 election, such 
as Akarca (2011a, 2011b and 2011c), Aslan-Akman (2012), Başkan and Güney 
(2012), Çarkoğlu (2011 and 2012), Çınar (2011), Kubicek (2011), and Tezcür (2012), 
only the last one of these dealt with the issue of the new voters.  Tezcür drew attention 
to the fact that in the south-eastern provinces the growth rate of the electorate was far 
more than the growth rate of the population and suggested correctly that this has 
worked against the incumbent party and in favour of the Kurdish nationalists.  
However, he did not go beyond that.  None of the studies listed addressed how the 
2 The GP, formed by a business tycoon and had a populist and Turkish-nationalist program, received 
7.2 percent of the votes in the first election it entered in 2002 when voters ousted all of the parties 
which entered the parliament in the previous election.  Akarca and Tansel (2012), who analyzed the 
inter-party vote traffic in that election, show that the GP captured about a third of the supporters of the 
center-left and nationalist Democratic Left Party (DSP).  The vote share of the DSP which was the 
incumbent party then declined from 22.2 percent in 1999 to 1.2 percent in 2002. The center-right DP 
which was named True Path Party (DYP) until 2007, held the premiership between 1991 and 1995.  
The party’s vote share was declining ever since. The political realignment process which led to the 
demise of the DP, DSP, and other parties is discussed in Akarca (2010, 2011b, 2011c) and is beyond 
the scope of the present study.   
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former DP and GP voters were shared between the remaining parties and how the new 
voters in other areas voted.   
 
The main purpose of the present study is to shed more light on the questions posed 
above.  This will be done in section 2 with the aid of descriptive statistics.  Then in 
section 3, through rigorous econometric methods, how the new votes cast in 2011 and 
votes cast by former supporters of the DP and GP were distributed among the major 
parties, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) will be studied.3  Finally in the last section, 
conclusions reached will be discussed. Our analysis will be based on data at the 
national, regional and provincial levels.  Another purpose of our study is to show how 
macro data can provide an alternative to micro data in answering the questions 
mentioned.   
 
2.          Source of New Voters 
 
Those who reached voting age in 2011 (14 to 17 years olds at the time of the 2007 
election), made up a large portion of the increase in registered voters.  However 
another reason for the increase was the switch in 2008 to a system of automatic 
registration of all citizens eligible to vote without any effort on their part.4  
Consequently, many people who usually do not or cannot participate in the political 
process got registered.  Of them, 2.4 million were citizens residing abroad.  Until 
now, such persons are allowed to vote only in parliamentary elections and only if 
they happen to enter or exit Turkey during one-month period preceding the election.  
Before 2011, only those expats who were able to vote were considered registered.  
In 2007 this figure was 228 thousand.  In 2011 on the other hand, all of the 2.6 
million potential voters living abroad were registered, of which only 129 thousand 
3 Of these the AKP is a conservative party.  Although its leaders were once Islamists, they 
have disavowed it and behaved during their reign since 2002, as a conservative democratic 
center-right party would.  Thus it would be correct to refer to them as Islamist-rooted rather 
than Islamist.  The CHP and DSP are center-left parties which have become increasingly 
Turkish-nationalist.  The MHP and the BDP are Turkish-nationalist and Kurdish nationalist 
parties, respectively.  The former is right-wing and the latter is left-wing ideologically.    
   
4 Since 2008, the electoral registers in Turkey are prepared and updated regularly by the state which 
does not require voluntary registration.  This is accomplished by matching of two databases through the 
identification numbers each citizen is assigned. One of the databases, known, as “Merkezi Nüfus İdare 
Sistemi” (the Central Population Registration System) or with its Turkish acronym MERNİS, contains 
information such as births, deaths, marriages, divorces, adoptions.  The other one, known as “Adrese 
Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi” (the Address Based Population Registration System) or with its Turkish 
acronym, ADNKS, covers addresses of all citizens.  For more details about the databases mentioned 
and how they are matched, the reader is referred to Taştı (2009).   
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actually voted.5  Considering only domestic residents, we can see from Table 1 that 
the rise in registered voters during the 26 months from March 2009 to July 2011 was 
2.2 million.  Since, in both elections, all voters eligible were registered under the 
new system, this figure can be attributed to addition of people reaching voting age 
(minus the already registered voters who died).  If we assume that the corresponding 
rate of change was the same between July 2007 and March 2009, then people 
reaching voting age during this period should be estimated at around 1.6 million.  
This implies that roughly 3.9 million of the 5.5 million additional voters registered 
during the same period were those who were eligible to vote in 2007 but failed to 
register.   
 
Although this figure may appear as extraordinarily high, it makes sense once one 
notices that, despite more than three-year’s worth of population increase between 
March 2004 and July 2007, the number of registered voters actually decreased by 
one million.  Thus the question should not be how come the number of registered 
voters was so high in 2011, but how come it was so low in 2007.6   Had the 
electorate increased between 2002 and 2007 elections at the same rate as it did in 
between the 1999 and 2002 elections, it would be about 3.9 million higher at the 
time of the 2007 election than the figure reported in Table 1.  In short, we can 
crudely guess that 2.4 million of the newly registered voters in 2011 were citizens 
living in foreign countries, about 3.8 million were domestic residents who turned 18 
between 2007 and 2011, and 3.9 million of them were those who failed to register in 
the 2007 election despite being eligible.    
 
Even though many of them were registered involuntarily, it is remarkable that the 
participation rate of the domestic electorate in 2011 was even higher than in 2007 
(87 percent vs. 84 percent).  A lesson that can be drawn from this is that registering 
people is a more effective way of making them vote than forcing them to vote, with 
threats of fines, after they register, as was the case in Turkey between 1983 and 
2008.  The participation rate for citizens living abroad on the other hand, was only 5 
percent.  This figure would rise in the future when expats will be able to vote in the 
countries they reside.  One other point worth noting is the fact that the proportion of 
invalid votes cast in 2011 was less than in 2007 (2.2 percent vs. 2.8 percent).  Thus 
the downward trend in that regard continues.  
5 The reason behind registering citizens residing abroad was to have them vote in the countries where 
they reside but the Supreme Council of Elections decided that there was not sufficient time to arrange a 
mechanism that would allow it for the 2011 election.    
6 The reason why the registration was so low in the July 2007 election is beyond the scope of the 
present study.  However conditions under which that election was scheduled can be given as the culprit.  
Due to a political crisis and to avoid a take-over by the military, the 2007 election was called abruptly a 
few months earlier than the date mandated by the constitution.  The election ended up being scheduled 
at a time when many people in urban areas take their vacations and many people in warm rural areas 
move temporarily to cooler highlands. 
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How the new voters and the former GP and DP supporters who switched parties 
were distributed across the country can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.  It appears that 
the new voters were disproportionately concentrated in the south-east, central-east, 
northwest and south, and the former DP and GP supporters in the west. To 
understand the reasons for this and what it implies, it will be useful to compare 
figures 1 and 2 with figure 3, where a 3-way partition of the country obtained by 
Akarca and Başlevent (2010), applying cluster analysis to the outcomes of five 
parliamentary and local administrations elections held between 1999 and 2009, is 
displayed.7  Although their partition is based on voting patterns, from Table 2 it can 
be seen that they also capture the divisions in the country from human development 
point of view. The clusters in Figure 3 are numbered to make referring to them 
easier.  Going from west to east, the first cluster which is painted black, follows the 
Mediterranean, Aegean and Marmara coasts (except Bursa province on the latter) 
and juts out from eastern Marmara Sea inland all the way to Kırşehir.  It also 
includes provinces which are adjacent to the coastal ones along the Aegean, and a 
few provinces scattered along the Black Sea coastline.  The 29 provinces in this 
group, where 59 percent of registered voters resided in 2011, represent the 
wealthiest, most-modern, most-educated, most-urbanized and most cosmopolitan 
part of Turkey as can be observed in Table 2.  The third cluster, painted light gray, 
covers a triangular corner of south-eastern and central-eastern Anatolian provinces.  
It includes 14 provinces where 9 percent of the registered voters lived in 2011.  This 
region is relatively the poorest and least developed part of Turkey, populated heavily 
by ethnic Kurds.  The second cluster, coloured dark grey, is composed of 38 
provinces where 32 percent of the registered voters were located in 2011.   It lies in 
between the other two regions not only geographically, but in regards to income and 
education levels, modernity, and conservatism as well.    
 
The proportion of valid votes received by political parties in 2007 and 2011 are 
given in Table 2 for the entire country and in Table 3 for the three clusters 
mentioned. CHP and DSP are treated as if they are one party (CHP+DSP) because 
they participated in the 2007 election as partners, under the CHP banner.8 Table 3 
shows that the AKP is the only party with significant presence across the board but 
its support is highest in cluster 2.  The party receives significant challenges from the 
Turkish-nationalist MHP and CHP+DSP in cluster 1 and from the Kurdish-
nationalist BDP in cluster 3.  The vote share of the CHP+DSP in cluster 2 is half of 
that in cluster 1 and fraction of it in cluster 3.  The MHP vote is distributed evenly 
7 Despite the country going through a major political realignment during 1999-2009, it is remarkable 
that Akarca and Başlevent (2010) found that each of the three clusters which emerged in each election 
during this period contained almost the same provinces.  This implies that provinces within each cluster 
tend to move in tandem when political changes occur in the country. 
8 However the DSP’s share in the two-party vote is negligible anyway.  The percentage of valid votes 
cast for the DSP was 1.22 in 2002, 2.12 in 2004, 2.85 in 2009, and 0.25 in 2011.      
 
                                                 
138 
European Research Studies, XVI (3), 2013 
Ali T. Akarca 
 
between clusters 1 and 2 but is almost non-existent in cluster 3.  The BDP is clearly 
a regional and ethnic-based party, receiving its votes almost exclusively in region 3 
where the Kurds are concentrated. Between 2007 and 2011, the party was able to 
raise its vote share substantially in that cluster.  This came mainly at the expense of 
the AKP.  Although the AKP raised its vote share between last two parliamentary 
elections, nationally and in clusters 1 and 2, its vote share declined in cluster 3.  The 
combined vote share of the CHP and the DSP rose nationally and in Clusters 1 and 
2.  On the other hand, vote share of the MHP declined slightly in cluster 1 but 
remained about the same in the rest of the country.   
 
That the clusters based on 1999-2009 voting patterns are still very relevant can be 
seen in the maps presented in Figure 4.  In those drawn for the AKP, CHP+DSP and 
MHP, the provinces in which the party’s vote share in 2011 was higher than its 
national average are painted in black.  In the case of the BDP, provinces coloured 
black and dark grey are the ones where the party’s provincial vote share exceeded its 
nationwide vote share.  Comparing maps in Figures 3 and 4, one can see that 
Clusters 1, 2, and 3 essentially overlap with the provinces where the relative 
strengths of the CHP+DSP, AKP and the BDP are concentrated, respectively.   
Comparing Figures 1 and 3, and referring to Table 5, one can observe that the 
proportion of new voters was predominantly higher in cluster 3.  New votes cast in 
2011 made up 18.4 percent of the valid votes cast nationally but this proportion was 
about 50 percent higher than the national average in cluster 3, 25 percent lower in 
cluster 2 and about the same in cluster 1.  New voters constituted more than a fifth 
of the electorate in 10 of the 14 provinces in cluster 3, and 15-20 percent in three of 
them.  Although there are such provinces in other clusters as well, these are 
provinces which receive large numbers of migrants from other parts of the country.  
Thus most of the “new” voters in these were not really new but people who have 
voted in previous elections in other provinces.  In other words, the make-up of the 
new voters is likely to vary across the clusters.  In cluster 3, where the population 
growth is high, the median age is low, and the net migration rate is negative, young 
people who have just reached the voting age will be a larger portion of the new 
voters than in clusters 1 and 2, especially in cluster 1.  With the help of Table, 5 and 
comparing Figures 2 and 3, on the other hand, one can see that the DP and GP 
supporters who switched to other parties were primarily residing in cluster 1 
provinces.  However their presence in Cluster 2 provinces was not negligible.  The 
votes of DP and GP in 2007 summed to 6.9 percent of all valid votes cast in 2011 
nationally, and 7.8, 6.0, and 3.8 percent of those cast in clusters 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively.  
 
It is clear from the information presented above that a lot of new voters and the 
voters lost by the DP and the GP were up for grabs in the 2011 election.  It is also 
clear that the AKP and the CHP+DSP captured bulk of them in Clusters 1 and 2 and 
the BDP in Cluster 3.  What is not so obvious however is how the former DP and 
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GP supporters and new voters got distributed among the AKP, CHP+DSP, MHP, 
and BDP.  Which party or parties captured the votes lost by the MHP in cluster 1 is 
not obvious either.  To gain a better insight on these, a more rigorous econometric 
analysis is needed such as the one which will be described in the next section.  
 
3. Modelling the Vote Movements 
 
Our econometric analysis is based on a set of vote equations, each of which expresses 
2011 votes of a major party as a function of its and other parties’ 2007 votes, and the 
new votes cast in 2011.  These equations are estimated jointly as a system, applying 
Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions procedure to cross-provincial data.  
Different sets of vote equations are specified and estimated for each of the provincial 
clusters discussed in the previous section.  The approach utilized allows estimation of 
vote shifts to a party from other parties and from the new voters, controlling for 
similar vote movements between other parties.9  Notes to Table 3 list the sources of 
the data, and give details about it. Notes to Figure 3 list the provinces which compose 
each cluster.  Henceforth, a party’s 2011 vote will be denoted by the party’s acronym 
followed by “11” and its vote in the 2007 election, by its acronym followed by “07”.  
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, CHP and DSP are treated as if they 
are one party.  BDP is treated as the successor party to the Democratic Society Party 
(DTP), as the former was established by the leadership of the latter, in anticipation of 
its closure by the Constitutional Court, and shared the same base.10  The number of 
new votes cast in 2011 (the difference between the valid votes cast in 2011 and 2007) 
will be referred to as “NV”.  All of the variables (including those with “07” in their 
name) are measured as a proportion of the valid votes cast in 2011, and are expressed 
in percentage points.  Equations are estimated for AKP11, CHP11+DSP11, MHP11, 
and the BDP11. The combined vote of these parties amounted to 94.7 percent of the 
valid votes cast in Turkey in 2011 (Table 3).  The independent variables used in the 
equations are the following: AKP07, CHP07+DSP07, MHP07, DP07, GP07, DTP07, 
and NV.  These, excluding NV, summed to 94.0 percent of the votes cast nationwide 
in 2007 (Table 3). 
 It is not feasible to have 2007 vote shares of all parties on the right hand sides of each 
equation, as this will lead to multi-colinearity. Consequently some of them need to be 
9 Since our aim is not to find the determinants of the vote transfers but to determine the magnitude and 
direction of vote movements, whatever were the reasons behind them, no economic performance 
variables are included in the equations. Data on such variables do not exist at the provincial level since 
2001 anyway, when the Turkish Statistical Institute stopped reporting provincial GDP figures.  
However Akarca (2011a, 2011b and 2011c) estimates the impacts of per capita GDP growth and 
inflation rate, using nationwide time-series data. 
 
10 These parties did not enter, respectively, the 2007 and the 2011 elections officially.  Instead their 
candidates ran as independents to circumvent the nationwide 10 percent threshold the political parties 
are required to surpass to be represented in the parliament.  The votes cast for the independent 
candidates supported by these parties are treated as if they are cast for them.  
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excluded.  Fortunately, the vote share of the AKP increased between 2007 and 2011 in 
every single province in clusters 1 and 2, and that of CHP+DSP, in all but a couple in 
which its vote loss was negligible.  Thus AKP07 can be eliminated from all equations 
for clusters 1 and 2, except the ones for AKP11, and the CHP07+DSP07 can be 
eliminated from all equations, except the ones for CHP11+DSP11.  Furthermore, the 
MHP07 variable can be removed from cluster 2 equations except the one for MHP11, 
as the MHP lost votes only in a very few provinces in that cluster and the losses 
involved were very small.   Dummy variables are included in the cluster 2 equations 
for the provinces of Rize and Sivas.  In these provinces, respectively the leaders of the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Grand Unity Party (BBP) ran as independent 
candidates in 2007 to circumvent the 10 percent nationwide threshold a party needs to 
surpass to get representation in the parliament.  As native sons they both received 
significant amount of votes.  When the former did not run in 2011 and the latter got 
deceased in 2009, the votes they received in 2007 moved to other parties in 2011.  For 
clusters 1 and 2, because the vote shares of BDP in 2011 and DTP in 2007 were very 
small, no vote equations for BDP11 are considered, and DTP07 is not included as an 
independent variable in the vote equations of other parties.  Due to limited number of 
observations in cluster 3, and the small sizes of the shares of the parties other than the 
AKP and the BDP (DTP in 2007), vote equations are estimated only for AKP11 and 
BDP11, and these included on their right hand sides only AKP07 and DTP07 as 
independent variables.  However dummy independent variables for Hakkari and 
Şanlıurfa are added, as these observations appeared in the estimation process as 
outliers.11   
 
The systems of equations estimated for each cluster are given in Tables 6, 7, and 8.  
Each system fits the data quite well.  Considering only the significant parameter 
estimates, the results can be interpreted as follows.  In cluster 1, the AKP and the 
CHP+DSP, besides maintaining their supporters from the previous election, each 
received about 40 percent of the new votes cast, and about half of the voters who 
deserted the DP.  The CHP+DSP captured in addition, all of the 2007 supporters of GP 
and a quarter of those of MHP.  The MHP on the other hand kept only three-fourths of 
its supporters and was not able to capture any noticeable portion of the new voters or 
voters who left the DP and GP.   In cluster 2, all of the major parties kept their 2007 
bases.  The AKP captured in addition about 57 percent of those who did not vote in 
2007, and 47 and 38 percent of those who voted for the DP and the GP, respectively. 
The corresponding proportions for the CHP+DSP were a fifth, a third, and a half.  
Slightly more than a third of the voters who supported the DP in 2007 and about a 
11 Although the AKP’s vote share increased in 78 provinces and declined only a little in two, the 
party’s vote share declined significantly in Hakkari.  Also the increase in BDP’s votes in this province 
was phenomenal and highest of all provinces in the country.  The rise in AKP’s vote share in Şanlıurfa 
was not only highest in the country it was substantially higher than what the party experienced in other 
provinces in the region.   
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tenth of the new voters seem to have voted for the MHP.  About two-thirds of the 
people in Rize who supported Mesut Yilmaz, the former leader of the ANAP who ran 
as an independent in 2007 have gone to the AKP and about one-third to the 
CHP+DSP.  On the other hand, about a half of the votes received by Muhsin 
Yazıcıoğlu, the deceased leader of BBP, who ran as an independent candidate in 2007 
in Sivas, moved to the AKP and the rest remained in his party.  In cluster 3, both the 
AKP and the BDP kept their 2007 supporters, but surprisingly all of the new votes 
went to the BDP and none of it to the AKP.  One exception to the general pattern 
observed in cluster 3 is Şanlıurfa, where the AKP captured an extra fifth of the 
electorate that would have gone to the BDP had the pattern in other cluster 3 provinces 
prevailed.  The situation in Hakkari however was the reverse.  There the BDP captured 
an extra fifth of the vote, 60 percent of which came at the expense of the AKP.  
 
Looked from another angle, in cluster 1, about four fifths of the new votes cast got 
shared almost equally by the AKP and the CHP+DSP.  In cluster 2, the AKP received 
almost three fifths of the new votes, the CHP+DSP, about a fifth, and the MHP a 
tenth. In cluster 3, the new votes went all to the BDP.  The voters who left the DP got 
shared by the AKP and the CHP+DSP in cluster 1, with the latter party receiving a 
slightly larger share.  In cluster 2 there was a three-way split of similar votes, with the 
AKP getting slightly larger share than the CHP+DSP and the MHP.  All of the GP 
votes in cluster 1 went to the CHP+DSP.  In cluster 2, the CHP+DSP received half of 
the GP votes, with two-fifths going to the AKP.  The DP and the GP had negligible 
votes in cluster 3, and the small numbers of observations in that cluster makes it 
impossible to determine their distribution reliably.    
 
4.          Conclusion 
 
Between the 2007 and 2011 elections, the Turkish electorate increased by about ten 
million.  In 2011, new voters cast nearly one out of every five votes. Besides routine 
increase in the population over 18, this is attributable to the unusually low registration 
in 2007 and to the change in the voter registration system which now registers 
automatically all eligible citizens, even those permanently residing abroad.  This many 
additional voters can be a game-changer and should be studied.  Although micro 
studies are needed also to get detailed information about the backgrounds of new 
voters and how they voted, an effort is made here in that direction, using macro data.   
 
As usual, only a fraction of citizens living abroad voted in 2011.  However, in the next 
election, when they will be allowed to vote in the countries they reside, their 
participation is expected to be higher.  Amazingly, despite involuntary registration of 
millions of voters, the participation rate of domestic residents not only did not suffer, it 
actually increased.  Thus we can say “if you register, they will vote”.  According to 
our results, the new voters were located disproportionately in the south-eastern and 
central-eastern provinces of the country (cluster 3) and in that region essentially all 
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voted for the BDP.  The AKP, the other major player in the area received no 
noticeable portion of them.  This was the main reason behind the increase in the 
BDP’s vote share and parliamentary representation.  In other regions of the country, 
the proportions of new voters who supported the AKP, CHP+DSP and MHP, 
compared to the regional vote shares of these parties in 2007, were about the same for 
the AKP and lower for the MHP, but a little higher in the case of the CHP+DSP. Thus 
the CHP can be described as another beneficiary of the new voter registration system, 
even though it was not as big a winner as the BDP.   
 
In the near future, the BDP’s vote share may move closer to the ten percent national 
threshold a party must surpass to enter the parliament, if it continues to capture bulk of 
the new voters in the south-eastern and central-eastern provinces, where population 
growth rate is high.  The probability of that happening will be even higher if the party 
manages to raise the turnout in the region which is relatively low now.  The BDP 
sympathizers outside its strongholds, many of whom now vote strategically for their 
second choice, may then choose to vote for their favourite.  Thus it should not be 
surprising to see in the near future the BDP or its successor to enter elections formally 
rather than fielding independent candidates.  The party may have to do that anyway to 
get a slice of the votes that will be cast abroad.12            
 
During 2007-2011, the country experienced also the deaths of the Young and the 
Democrat parties, the former literally and latter for all practical purposes.  These 
parties did not have significant presence in the south-east and central-east of the 
country (cluster 3).  In other parts, their votes essentially got split between the AKP, 
CHP+DSP and the MHP. The votes shed by the DP in the northwest-west-south-west 
region (cluster 1) went mainly to the AKP and CHP+DSP, with the share of the latter 
being a little larger.  In the north-northeast-central section of the country (cluster 2), 
besides the two parties mentioned, the MHP got a piece of the DP votes as well.  
However the AKP’s portion was a little more than that of the almost equal shares of 
the other two parties.  All of the GP votes in the northwest-west-southwest, and half of 
them in the north-northeast-central section of the country, went to the CHP+DSP.  The 
AKP got about two-fifths of it in the latter region.    
 
In short, the vote shares of the AKP, CHP+DSP and the BDP increased significantly 
between 2007 and 2011.  The rise for the BDP came mainly from the new voters and 
for the AKP and the CHP, from the decay of the DP and GP.  In the case of the CHP, 
the votes it captured from the MHP and the new voters were contributing factors as 
well. Had the voter registration system was not changed, the BDP vote share would 
12 Those residing abroad are allowed to pick a party only.  Their ballot is considered to be cast for all of 
the candidates of that party in the country. The vote total in each province is increased by the 
proportion of votes cast abroad relative to those cast domestically.  The increase is then distributed 
among the parties according to their shares in the votes cast abroad.    
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have been lower and the AKP share higher.  Had the DP and GP did not disappear, the 
AKP, CHP and to some extent the MHP vote shares would have been lower.   
 
The ramifications of the new voter registration system will continue in the next 
parliamentary election, when close to 3 million voters living abroad is expected to 
vote.  They will constitute about 5 percent of the electorate.  If the votes cast by the 
expats at entry/exit points of the country now is any guide, the AKP which received 62 
percent of such votes in 2011, and 58 percent in 2007, is likely to be the main 
beneficiary of the votes to be cast abroad.   There is talk now that the ban on voting by 
nearly half a million conscript soldiers will be lifted.13 That would favour the AKP 
also, as the privates come disproportionately from rural and conservative backgrounds.   
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Table 1 
   Number of voters and votes cast   
 
                                                                
Notes:Rate of participation is percentage of registered voters who voted.  Rate of invalid votes is the percentage of votes cast which were declared 
invalid.  Figures given for 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2011 are for parliamentary elections, and those for 2004 and 2009 are for provincial council 
elections. 
 
Sources:  Tuncer (1999, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011), Tuncer, Kasapbaş (2004) and Tuncer, Kasapbaş and Tuncer (2003).  
 
 
April 
1999 
 
Domestic 
residents only 
 
November 
2002 
 
Domestic 
residents only 
 
March 
2004 
   
Domestic 
residents only                        
 
July 
2007 
   
Domestic 
residents only                             
 
March 
2009 
 
Domestic 
residents only             
 
 
June 
2011        
 
Domestic 
residents only 
 
All 
 
 
Registered voters 
 
 
37,429,120 
 
41,291,568 
 
43,552,931 
 
42,571,284 
 
48,049,446 
 
50,237,343 
 
52,806,322 
 
Votes cast 
 
 
32,589,973 
 
32,652,702 
 
33,211,457 
 
35,828,274 
 
40,932,260 
 
43,785,665 
 
43,914,948 
 
Rate of participation (%) 
 
 
87.07 
 
79.08 
 
76.26 
 
84.16 
 
85.19 
 
87.16 
 
83.16 
 
Valid votes 
 
 
31,119,242 
 
31,414, 748 
 
32,268,496 
 
34,822,907 
 
39,988,763 
 
42,813,896 
 
42,941,763 
 
Rate of invalid votes (%) 
 
 
4.51 
 
3.79 
 
2.84 
 
 2.81 
 
2.31 
 
2.22 
 
2.22 
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Figure 1 
Proportion of new voters in 2011 
 
 
 
Notes: The percentages reported refer to the differences between registered voters 
in 2011 and 2007, in proportion to the former.   
 
Sources: Tuncer (2007 and 2011).  
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                       Figure 2 
          Decrease in DP + GP votes between 2007 and 2011  
 
 
 
Notes:  
The percentages reported refer to the decreases in the aggregate votes cast for the 
two parties between 2007 and 2011, in proportion to registered voters in 2011 
 
Sources:  
Tuncer (2007 and 2011).  
 
 
                                     Figure 3 
Provincial clusters with different voting patterns in Turkey 
 
 
148 
    European Research Studies Vol.XV II  Issue(3), 2013 
               A.T. Akarca  
 
 
  
 Notes:  
 For each of the five elections between 1999 and 2009, the provinces are grouped 
into three, using cluster analysis (k-means method).  Going from west to east, the 
clusters are numbered 1 through 3 (colored black, dark grey, and light gray, 
respectively).  The provinces which changed clusters between elections are 
placed in the region in which they appeared most.  A tie occurred only in the case 
of Kars.  The province appeared once in region 1, twice in region 2 and twice in 
region 3.  It was placed in region 2, based on the weighted average.  In 2011, 
59.02 percent of all registered voters resided in cluster 1, 32.19 percent in cluster 
2, and 8.79 percent in cluster 3.  
 
The regions include the following provinces: 
 
Cluster 1 (29 provinces):  Adana, Amasya, Ankara, Antalya, Artvin, Aydın, 
Balıkesir, Bilecik, Burdur, Çanakkale, Denizli, Edirne, Eskişehir, Hatay, Mersin, 
İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kırşehir, Kocaeli, Manisa, Muğla, Sinop, Tekirdağ, 
Uşak, Zonguldak, Bartın, Ardahan and Yalova. 
 
Cluster 2 (38 provinces): Adıyaman, Afyon, Bolu, Bursa, Çankırı, Çorum, 
Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Isparta, Kars, 
Kastamonu, Kayseri, Konya, Kütahya, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Nevşehir, 
Niğde, Ordu, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sivas, Tokat, Trabzon, Yozgat, Aksaray, 
Bayburt, Karaman, Kırıkkale, Karabük, Kilis, Osmaniye and Düzce.  
 
Cluster 3 (14 provinces): Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, 
Siirt,  
Tunceli, Şanlıurfa, Van, Batman, Şırnak and Iğdır.   
 
Source:  
Akarca and Başlevent (2011).  
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Table 2 
The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of clusters:  
Means of various indicators in 2000  
 
Notes: In the computation of mean years of schooling for each province, 15, 11, 8, and 5 
years of schooling are attributed, respectively, to university, high school, middle school, 
and primary school graduates in the province.  Two years-worth of schooling is attributed 
to those who are literate but not a graduate of any school.  Children under age six are 
omitted in computing the mean.  The cluster means given are the averages of provincial 
means weighted with the 2000 population figures with the exception of population density 
which is weighted with the surface area of the province.  The net migration rate is for the 
1995-2000 period. 
Source: Akarca and Başlevent (2011).    
 
 
Indicator 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Turkey 
Proportion of urban population (%) 72.0 57.7 55.3 64.9 
Population density  
(persons per square km) 138.0 65.1 57.2 88.0 
Proportion of non-agricultural 
Employment (%) 66.2 39.6 32.7 52.7 
Female share in non-agricultural 
employment (%) 19.3 12.0 6.8 15.2 
Per Capita GDP   
(thousand TL) 2.3 1.3 0.7 1.8 
Net migration rate  
(per thousand) 22.8 -17.9 -41.6 0.7 
Proportion of population born in another 
province (%) 41.0 15.0 8.8 27.8 
 
Average years of schooling 
 
5.9 5.1 3.6 5.3 
 
Median age (years) 
 
27.1 24.6 17.3 25.1 
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Table 3 
 Turkish political parties and their nationwide vote shares (%) 
 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
2007 
 
2011 
 
 
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 
 
 
46.58 
 
 
49.83 
 
 
Felicity Party and 
People’s Voice Party (SP+HAS) 
 
 
 
2.34 
 
 
2.04 
 
 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
 
 
14.27 
 
13.01 
 
 
Republican People’s Party and 
Democratic Left Party (CHP+DSP) 
 
 
 
20.88 
 
 
26.23 
 
 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
 
 
5.42 
 
0.65 
 
 
Young Party (GP) 
 
 
3.04 
 
 
 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
Peace and  Democracy Party (BDP) 
 
 
3.84 
 
 
5.67 
 
 
Other Parties 
 
 
2.23 
 
1.67 
 
 
Independents  
 
 
1.40 
 
0.90 
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Notes:  
The percentages reported are votes cast for the respective parties, in proportion to 
valid votes cast in the years indicated. In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of 
political parties.  The parties which are successors or predecessors of each other are 
put in the same cell to facilitate comparisons.  The Democrat Party (DP) was named 
True Path Party (DYP) prior to the 2007 election. The Democratic Society Party 
(DTP), and its sucessor party, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), did not enter, 
respectively, the 2007 and the 2011 elections officially.  Instead their candidates ran 
as independents to circumvent the nationwide 10 percent threshold the political 
parties are required to exceed to be represented in the parliament.  The 2007 and 2011 
figures shown for these parties are the aggregate vote shares of the independent 
candidates supported by them.  The Democratic Left Party (DSP) entered the 2007 
election in partnership and under the banner of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). 
This party’s vote share was 1.22 percent in 2002 and 0.25 percent in 2011. The 
People’s Voice Party split from the Felicity Party in 2010. The party’s vote share in 
the 2011 election was 0.77 percent.  Blank spots in the table indicate that the party in 
question did not enter the election.     
 
 
Sources:   
Tuncer (2007 and 2011)  
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Table 4 
Vote shares of political parties in various clusters (%)  
 
 
 
Political Parties 
 
 
Cluster 1 
 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
 
2007 
 
 
2011 
 
2007 
 
2011 
 
2007 
 
2011 
 
 
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 
 
 
39.98 
 
44.58 
 
57.53 
 
61.47 
 
48.29 
 
42.09 
 
 
Felicity Party and  
People’s Voice Party (SP+HAS) 
 
 
 
2.10 
 
 
1.80 
 
 
2.98 
 
 
2.68 
 
 
1.29 
 
 
1.14 
 
 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
 
 
15.49 
 
13.54 
 
 
14.49 
 
14.63 
 
3.49 
 
2.72 
 
 
Republican People’s Party  and 
Democratic Left Party (CHP + DSP) 
 
 
 
27.29 
 
 
34.11 
 
 
13.40 
 
 
17.31 
 
 
4.54 
 
 
4.21 
 
 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
 
 
5.61 
 
0.67 
 
5.23 
 
0.70 
 
4.77 
 
0.33 
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Notes:  
The percentages reported are votes cast for the respective parties, in proportion to valid votes cast in the years 
indicated.  Provinces in each cluster are listed in notes to Figure 3.  
 
Sources:   
The same as Table 3 for vote shares, and Figure 3 for the composition of clusters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young Party (GP) 
 
4.10 1.77 0.44 
 
 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
Peace and  Democracy Party (BDP) 
 
 
2.29 
 
 
3.12 
 
0.86 
 
 
1.27 
 
29.93 
 
 
41.58 
 
 
Other Parties 
 
 
1.94 
 
1.66 
 
2.11 
 
1.72 
 
1.57 
 
1.63 
 
 
Independents  
 
 
1.20 
 
0.52 
 
1.63 
 
0.22 
 
5.68 
 
6.30 
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Figure 4 
Vote shares of main political parties in 2011 
 
A. AKP 
 
 
 
 
B. CHP + DSP 
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C. MHP 
 
 
 
D. BDP 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 The percentages reported are votes cast for the respective parties, in 
proportion to valid votes cast in 2011.  Provinces in which a party’s vote 
share exceeded its nationwide vote share are colored black, in the cases 
of the AKP, CHP+DSP, and MHP.  In the case of the BDP, provinces 
colored black and dark grey are the ones where the party’s provincial 
vote share exceeded its nationwide vote share.  
 
Source: 
Tuncer (2011). 
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Table 5 
Breakdown of votes cast in 2011 according to the party voted for in 2007 (%) 
 
 
 
Notes: The information given in the notes to Tables 3 and 4 apply here as well.  However 
the percentages reported here are votes cast for the respective parties in 2007, in proportion 
to valid votes cast in 2011.   
 
 
Party voted for in 2007  
 
Turkey 
 
 
Cluster1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
 
 
Justice & Development 
Party (AKP) 
 
 
38.02 
 
32.10 
 
49.63 
 
35.21 
 
 
Felicity Party (SP)  
 
 
1.91 
 
1.68 
 
2.57 
 
0.94 
 
 
Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) 
 
 
11.65 
 
12.44 
 
12.49 
 
2.54 
 
 
Republican People’s Party 
and 
Democratic Left Party 
(CHP+DSP) 
 
 
 
17.04 
 
 
21.91 
 
 
11.56 
 
 
3.31 
 
 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
 
 
4.42 
 
4.50 
 
4.51 
 
3.47 
 
Young Party (GP) 
 
 
2.48 
 
3.29 
 
1.53 
 
0.32 
 
 
Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) 
 
 
3.13 
 
1.86 
 
0.74 
 
21.82 
 
 
Other Parties 
 
 
1.60 
 
1.55 
 
1.82 
 
1.15 
 
Independents  
 
 
1.37 
 
0.96 
 
1.40 
 
4.14 
 
 
New voters 
 
 
18.38 
 
19.70 
 
13.74 
 
27.10 
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Sources: The same as Table 3 for vote shares, and as Figure 3 for the composition of 
clusters. 
    
 
 Table 6  
     Estimated vote equations: Cluster 1  
 
 
 
Notes: For the definitions of variables, see Section 3.  For the provinces included in region 
1, see the notes to Figure 3. The equations are estimated as a system of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions, using the Zellner (1962) procedure.  The numbers in parantheses are the t-
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
E q u a t i o n s  
 
 
AKP11   
 
CHP11 
+ 
DSP11  
 
 
MHP11    
 
Constant 
 
 
-6.04 
(1.00) 
 
-5.13 
(1.50) 
 
 4.37 
(1.33) 
 
AKP07 
 
 
    1.17*** 
(11.87) 
  
 
 
CHP07+DSP07 
 
 
 
 
       1.02*** 
(12.62) 
 
 
MHP07 
 
 
 0.10 
(0.92) 
 
     0.26*** 
(2.60) 
 
    0.73** 
(5.86) 
 
DP07 
 
 
   0.44** 
(2.38) 
 
     0.50*** 
(2.81) 
 
-0.06 
(0.26) 
 
GP07 
 
 
 0.32 
(1.26) 
 
     1.02*** 
(5.06) 
 
-0.12 
(0.52) 
 
NV 
 
     0.41*** 
(4.45) 
 
     0.39*** 
(4.93) 
 
0.07 
(0.75) 
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values in absolute value.  The single, double and triple asterisk superscripts indicate 
significance at ten, five and one percent levels respectively, in one tail tests.  
 
Source:  Author’s computations. 
 
 
Table 7   
   Estimated vote equations: Cluster 2  
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
E q u a t i o n s 
 
 
AKP11       
 
CHP11 
+ 
DSP11   
 
 
MHP11     
 
  
 
Constant 
 
 
-2.36 
(0.85) 
 
   -2.97*** 
(2.41) 
 
-1.29 
(0.78) 
 
AKP07 
 
 
        1.07*** 
(24.06) 
  
 
CHP07+DSP07 
 
 
 
 
       1.27*** 
(20.10) 
 
 
MHP07 
 
   
      1.01*** 
(15.94) 
 
DP07 
 
    
     0.47*** 
(4.) 
    
     0.34*** 
(3.20) 
 
     0.37*** 
(2.62) 
 
GP07 
 
 
   0.38** 
(2.22) 
 
     0.51*** 
(2.74) 
 
0.21 
(0.82) 
 
NV 
 
       0.57*** 
(11.73) 
 
      0.21*** 
(4.54) 
 
  0.11* 
(1.64) 
 
RIZE 
 
    12.28*** 
(7.19) 
 
     8.35*** 
(4.29) 
 
1.50 
(0.56) 
 
SIVAS 
 
     5.45*** 
(3.19) 
 
-2.98 
(1.55) 
 
0.84 
(0.31) 
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System Weighted R-square  =  0.91 
 
 
Notes: For the definitions of variables, see Section 3.  For the provinces included in 
region 2, see the notes to Figure 3. The equations are estimated as a system of 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, using the Zellner (1962) procedure.  The 
numbers in parantheses are the t-values in absolute value.  The single, double and 
triple asterisk superscripts indicate significance at ten, five and one percent levels 
respectively, in one tail tests.  
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
Table 8    
Estimated vote equations: Cluster 3  
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
E q u a t i o n s  
 
AKP11   
 
BDP11  
 
Constant 
 
 
7.43 
(1.23) 
 
-7.38 
(0.94) 
 
AKP07 
 
 
       0.98*** 
(10.08) 
 
 
DTP07 
  
     1.03*** 
(3.17) 
 
NV 
 
-0.12 
(0.58) 
 
     1.15*** 
(3.36) 
 
ŞANLIURFA 
 
    21.51*** 
(4.05) 
 
 -22.08** 
(2.11) 
 
HAKKARİ 
 
-12.25** 
(2.54) 
 
  20.08** 
(2.52) 
 
System Weighted R-square  =  0.92 
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Notes: For the definitions of variables, see Section 3.  For the provinces included in 
region 3, see the notes to Figure 3.  The equations are estimated as a system of 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, using the Zellner (1962) procedure.  The numbers 
in parantheses are the t-values in absolute value. The single, double and triple 
asterisk superscripts indicate significance at ten, five and one percent levels 
respectively, in one tail tests.  
 
Source:  Author’s computations. 
 
